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Marco Zingano 
This collection of essays gathers twelve contributions on the topic of 
friendship, ten of which span from Plato’s time to Aquinas’, with the last two chapters 
devoted to examining the thought of Kant and Hölderlin, two Modern thinkers. It 
purports “to direct a spotlight on the most salient points in what proved to be an 
enduring theme in philosophical literature” (ix). The collection is presented as having 
a “modest aim” (ibidem), if compared to ambitions such as to provide a 
comprehensive survey of the notion of friendship in Western thought. It is indeed 
restricted to its expressed aim, and it succeeds in large measure in achieving it, for we 
do find in this collection a very interesting and illuminating string of studies on how 
friendship was conceived from Ancient to Medieval times according to its major 
moments, each paper striving to clearly present the pith of what such an impressive 
array of thinkers as Plato (chap. 1), Aristotle (chaps. 2 and 3), the Stoics (chap. 3), the 
Epicureans (chap. 5), Cicero (chap. 6), Augustine (chap. 8) and Aquinas (chap. 10) 
said about it. We might expect to find philosophers poring over the main aspects of 
this human, sometimes all too human, affection that serves as the cement of our 
intimate ties with other people. It ends up, however, disclosing some sort of obsession 
philosophers had with what one may call perfect friendship, that so virtuous an 
intimacy amongst friends that we are inevitably lifted up to the moral heights thanks 
to it – or else that friendship only those who are already there can display. 
It should not have been so, though, as we learn already from the first chapter 
that Plato was eager to distinguish between three forms of philia. The chapter on Plato 
is written by Dimitri El Murr, who endeavours to present a three-layered notion of 
philia: a friendship arising from opposites, which proves to be nothing other than the 
search for bodily pleasures, aiming at sensual repletion in which the beloved is but a 
means to the lover’s pleasures; a friendship from resemblance, to which reciprocity is 
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crucial, so that the parties linked by this bond are similarly driven by a desire of virtue 
to the effect that each seeks the good of the other; and a third one, a mixed friendship, 
resulting from a combination of the two others, in which the drive to make the 
beloved an instrument for the satisfaction of bodily pleasures is countered by the 
opposing drive of a genuine concern for the beloved’s own good. To do this, El Murr 
bases his analyses on a less discussed passage of Plato’s last dialogue, Laws VIII 
836e-837d, in which the Athenian discloses these three forms in a conversation with 
Cleinias. By so doing, El Murr wants to shed light on other much more famous 
passages, making us thus read retrospectively the aporetic Lysis and the so much 
celebrated description of love in the Phaedrus in line with the lessons given at the 
Laws passage. This approach makes him privilege the political aspect of friendship, 
and consequently he devotes the last part of his paper to examining civic friendship in 
the Laws and in the Republic. By the same token, Diotima’s speech on love has no 
longer the lion’s share in the treatment of Platonic love, and the reader has to wait for 
other papers to find an analysis of the Symposium. 
 As we shall see, the Symposium is key to understanding how friendship 
became that moral ascent friends have to go through as they abandon the bodily 
pleasures and turn themselves towards the intelligible Realm of Beauty and Forms. 
One may thus worry that El Murr’s strategy somehow misfires. But I think his 
strategy pays off, and a lot. For by so doing he puts his finger on a very important 
issue Plato and the late Academy are tinkering with, namely, the problem of concepts 
whose unity falls short of a genus, so that they can no longer be expressed in terms of 
a universal whose defining traits are separately necessary and collectively sufficient 
for an item to be subsumed under it. The very notion of pleasure seems to elude 
generic unity, and that causes much trouble to its definition in the Philebus. In the 
same vein, in the Phaedrus, love proves to be a two-sided notion, a left side replete 
with bodily pleasures, but also a right side, thanks to which one ascends to knowledge 
and the pure Forms, going definitely past all bodily pleasures. Both are cases of love, 
and genuine cases of love; they overlap one another, but neither collapses into the 
other or can be reduced to it without remainder. The Greek term for friendship, philia, 
can also designate love, which causes some trouble in its semantical analysis, but the 
point is that friendship gets contaminated with this falling short of generic unity, and 
this is a true philosophical trouble. As the Athenian puts it, we call friend (i) what is 
similar regarding virtue, but also (ii) what is needy to what is rich, in spite of their 
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dissimilarity (Laws VIII 837a6-9). Still, there is the third form, resulting from the 
combination of the two others. Three cases, only one word; to quote the Athenian 
again, ἓν ὄνομα περιλαβὸν πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ σκότον ἀπεργάζεται, “one term 
covering <them all> engenders the whole aporia and obscurity” (837a3-4). 
 How to get out of it? Certainly not by proposing a definition by means of 
conjunctions: friendship is (i) and (ii) and (iii); in classical thought, such a procedure 
can at most amount to a description of the several types in question, which prepares 
the path for the definition, but surely cannot be taken as one. Aristotle ruminated a lot 
over this problem, and came up with two different answers to how to unify the 
distinct, and genuine, forms of friendship. In the Eudemian Ethics, he proposes to put 
them together by means of a new conceptual tool he seems to have conceived of out 
of scratch specifically to get out of the muddle friendship puts one in. It is the 
celebrated notion of focal meaning, which, when applied to being, produces the well-
known results we read in his Metaphysics. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he drops it 
however, and substitutes resemblance for focal meaning as the key notion to keep 
them together as correctly named cases of friendship, even though no generic unity 
can be ascribed to them. The topic of friendship, typically at home in moral treatises, 
spills over logical issues on unity and conceptual reference. And this spilling over 
help us explain at least part of the interest Aristotle attached so strongly to this topic. 
 Gary Gurtler devotes his analysis to Aristotelian friendship with two aims in 
mind: (i) to discern how the different aspects of friendship can be understood in terms 
of the four causes, and (ii) how to relate friendship towards contemplation, so that it 
becomes no longer “solely a moral virtue” (36). The first aim is in itself laudable, as it 
tries to apply an Aristotelian schema to an Aristotelian topic. In a nutshell, good will 
is the moving cause; the activities flowing from it constitute the formal cause; the 
character of the individual is the material cause; and the other, the friend, as good is 
the final cause. However, the three genuine kinds of friendship Aristotle 
acknowledges he has to reckon with – friendship grounded on pleasure, on utility, and 
on virtue – are presented as three species of friendship (38; 39). They are somewhat 
brought back to order as they can harmlessly be subsumed under a same genus. 
Instead, the problem lies elsewhere, to wit: in the fact that, although we all strive for 
the sake of the friend’s good, there always lurks the ambiguity between an apparent 
good and the real good, as we can take utility or pleasantness for the purposes of a 
friendship, instead of developing it based on virtue. To quote Gurtler: 
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While good will can lead to friendship, under certain conditions where the other is seen as 
good and where each party has good will for the other for the other’s sake, there are other 
situations, where utility or pleasure are the moving causes, that do not lead to friendship, but 
other relationships beneficial to both parties, but each for one’s own sake. The confusion of 
many commentators can be traced to not recognizing this distinction. (40-41). 
 That logical issue Aristotle is trying to tackle is put aside, as a matter of fact it 
completely disappears. There are no longer three forms of friendship, but only one, 
the perfect, virtuous friendship. We are thrown back to the period before Cooper’s 
seminal paper (Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, published in 1977), in which he 
convincingly argued how important it is to keep in mind that there are three genuine 
kinds of friendship, that they do overlap, but cannot be reduced to one of them or be 
taken as species of a common kind. Gurtler’s step backwards, pressing for only one 
case of true friendship, is quite a controversial move, to say the least: the confusion of 
many a commentator, if confusion there is, is rather to be traced to the difficulties the 
non-generic unity in question brings along to the correct understanding of its unifying 
power, not to the commentators’ acknowledgement of this very peculiar problem. The 
second thesis of this paper (the connection between friendship and contemplation in 
terms of their not being so much in competition as exclusive choices, but as practical 
virtue having its end in contemplation as the end that is complete and final) may have 
interesting outcomes, but it suffers from the downplaying of the three kinds of 
friendship by means of the apparent-real opposition and the correspondent jettisoning 
of utility and pleasantness as genuine objects of friendship.     
 Suzanne Stern-Gillet paper on megalopsuchia is a very illuminating analysis 
of “the crown of the virtues”, as Aristotle has it. Her aim is to make Aristotle’s eulogy 
of it appear less distasteful to those who take pride as a vice (and they are legion in 
Modern times) or see humility as a virtue. (Pride, she remarks, is the least acceptable 
translation; magnanimity, high-mindedness, great-soulness or great-heartedness are 
more acceptable, but none of them carries the semantic connotations Aristotle 
attaches to his megalopsuchia). She does succeed in her task, as she shows that, 
despite its aristocratic hues, megalopsuchia is “best understood as an asset to any city-
state with a sound constitution, although an aristocratic regime in which government 
is in the hands of the best among the citizens would give him the greatest opportunity 
for putting his overall excellence at the service of the polis” (74-75). The 
megalopsuchos’s self-sufficiency calls into discussion whether he needs friends or 
not, and how to equate self-love with friends. Stern-Gillet shows very convincingly 
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that “we can safely assume that he is capable of the highest of the three kinds of 
friendship distinguished in both Ethics” (67). We have here a glimpse that she adopts 
what we take as the sound Aristotelian doctrine of three kinds of friendship, but 
unfortunately her discussion of megalopsuchia, which is very illuminating in itself, is 
not in position to recall that distinction and put it back on the right track. It should be 
noticed that she devotes the last part of her paper to show that mikropsuchia, the vice 
opposed to megalopsuchia, “is not to be thought as the Greek counterpart of humility” 
(70) for this is to conflate the reticence to lay claim to goods of which one is worthy, 
which is the meaning of the Aristotelian mikropsuchia, and the propensity to value 
others above oneself (our notion of humility), thus distorting Aristotle’s meaning. 
 The second part of the book, devoted to the Hellenistic philosophers, shows 
how influential Plato’s Symposium became to any treatment of friendship, thus 
making subside, to the point of burying it completely, the issue of bringing together 
three irreducible kinds of friendship. From now one, it is basically a report (with some 
exceptions, such as the Epicureans) on how to ascend from bodily desire to virtue 
friendship, which is the real and only friendship. Bernard Collette-Ducic examines the 
Stoic philosophy, showing very clearly how indebted they are to Plato’s Symposium. 
Focusing on the sage, he mounts a convincing case about the pedagogical interest the 
sage has in associating with young boys, as the sage sets the ones he loves onto the 
path of virtue by being friends with them (all love is ultimately to be replaced by 
friendship, which is a good, whereas love is an indifferent). But here a paradox seems 
to loom. The young boys are non-sages; what benefit will the sage obtain from these 
associations? One answer would be: nothing, but the young boys will profit a lot, as 
they are thus set onto the path of virtue. The relation would then be directed to the 
beloved own good. Is this a sign that the Stoic sage is altruistic? The point Collette 
argues for is that he is not altruistic: “if a sage seeks to make a friend, it is first of all 
because he is eager to exercise his virtues and benefit from them” (107). The beloved 
provide the Stoic sage with an opportunity to exercise one of his virtues. The key 
notion in their being friends is not altruism, but that of exercise, usus, which is central 
to Stoic philosophy. Having a friend is an outcome of having made a friend, but this 
is rather a bonus, for what really matters is that, while making friends, the Stoic sage 
puts into practice, he makes use of his virtues, and this is the “the greatest of all 
possible goods” (106). Moreover, by doing this, the sage is not only gazing at his own 
navel, but connecting himself to the whole world, for the world will also be benefitted 
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(included the beloved), given that “it is a law of nature that an act cannot benefit its 
author without also contributing to the common good, that is, to the good of everyone 
else” (103). With such a law, the loop is closed – but could it not be closed with such 
a law? 
 Harry Lesser brings us back to earth in his “Erôs and Philia in Epicurean 
Philosophy” (117-131). Essential to Epicurean ethics is the long-term satisfaction of 
our wants and the peace of mind that comes as a result of it. In Book IV of De rerum 
natura Lucretius states the one should not avoid the “fruit of Venus, but rather takes 
the advantages without the penalty” (1073-74). Those who satisfy their sexual 
impulses are healthy; what comes as a surprise, notes Lesser, is that amor, love, is 
called frenzy and madness, some lines later. Erotic love is thus negatively contrasted 
with sexual desire; the reason seems to be that erotic love is a desire that cannot be 
satisfied, and so is incompatible with peace of mind: “to be in love, as opposed to 
merely feeling sexual desire, is necessarily to be in mental pain: consummation of the 
love brings a short temporary relief from the pain, but it will soon start again” (120). 
In fact, according to Lucretius, there is actual hatred in love, as the behaviour of 
lovers shows that both occur at the same time (Lesser quotes IV 1079-83, as the 
lovers hurt the body, faciunt dolorem corporis, and often set their teeth in the lips and 
kiss roughly, dentis inlidunt saepe labellis osculaque adfligunt, which is a nice poetic 
passage on our human messy relationships). All this comes together to hinder us from 
attaining any stability, let alone ataraxia. This explains also why the possibility of 
converting love into philia, which has a typical Platonic ring, is ruled out by the 
Epicureans. For friendship is a long-term relationship, accompanied by goodwill, not 
concerned only with obtaining pleasure, but also, and primarily, directed to the good 
of the person with whom we are friends, whereas love has the opposite 
characteristics: it is only concerned with obtaining pleasure and is not accompanied 
by goodwill. This much sets the contrast between love and sex, and why friendship 
will not come about as a result of erotic love. 
 The following chapter is devoted to Cicero’s De amicitia, in which Robin 
Weiss endeavours to show that Laelius’ contradictions are only apparent. The debt to 
Plato’s Symposium is again highlighted, with this important correction that love is not 
born of need (and so Socrates’ and Aristophanes’ positions in that dialogue are not 
vindicated, for neither has the whole truth). To do this, she revisits the Stoic notion of 
oikeiôsis, showing that we rather reach out for what preserves our being, so that, in 
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the Stoic perspective advanced in Cicero’s dialogue, “love is actually born of an 
internal abundance of the very thing we seek outside ourselves in another – virtue” 
(162). Her vision of the Stoic friendship is quite optimistic, as she writes that it 
“involves all of the erotic components of romantic love, but without its shortcomings 
and imperfections” (ibidem). 
 Among the papers devoted to Medieval philosophy, two of them are rather 
descriptive. As friendship itself is a sort of journey along which we get acquainted 
with our friend’s nature, John Manoussakis’ paper on Gregory Nazianzen and Basil 
the Great espouses the very unfolding of their common path in a sort of narrative of 
the ups and downs of their friendship, intertwined as it is with the history of the 
Church. Sommerfeldt’s chapter on Aelred of Rievaulx gives us interesting 
information on how Aelred conceived of friendship in his treatise On Spiritual 
Friendship. On the other hand, the paper on Augustine and Aquinas are much more 
analytical. Tamer Nawar insists on the rather negative role friendship plays in the first 
books of Augustine’s Confessions, but comes to the conclusion that friendship is not, 
in the Confessions, exclusively negative, for in the later books a more positive role is 
attributed to it in fostering virtue, even though “Augustine takes care to note that 
friendship may not only point us toward virtue, but also towards vice” (214). Fergus 
Kerr writes on Aquinas, and tries to show that the notion of charitas underwent an 
important change from the early Scriptum on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, to its 
treatment in the IIa IIae of the Summa. He contends that, in the Summa, owing to a 
direct influence of the Nicomachean Ethics, there is a new model for charity, in which 
the persons involved should resemble each other in being virtuous, and this new 
stance on charity is modelled after Aristotle’s doctrine of friendship. The relationship 
is grounded on shared goodness, and this novel model “is a daring model for charity” 
(251). The novelty resides in this, that each loves the other for the sake of the friend, 
there being friendship only between equals. According to Kerr, what is crucial in this 
new model is that “there is no question of one partner’s losing his or her identity in 
the other” (265). The consequence, in theological terms, is that it is “at last possible 
for us to let God be God in the knowledge that God let us be us” (264). In a less 
theological tone, there is, in charity as conceived according to the Aristotelian model 
of friendship, no submission to, or annihilation of the self in the absolute other, or 
God (as, apparently, it was still supposed to be the case in the Scriptum). However, 
Kerr stresses that this new model of envisaging charity “has had little success in 
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Christian theology and spirituality” (251). It is worth noting in philosophical terms 
that as he engages in a reconstruction of the Aristotelian doctrine of friendship, Kerr 
admits of three kinds of friendship, but seems to credit this non-uniform version of 
friendship to an alleged Aristotelian “analogical vision of the world”, which he does 
not elaborate further. 
 The last two chapters deal with Kant and Hölderlin. The latter, written by 
Sandra Ducic-Collette, remains at two removes from the other essays, as it concerns a 
Modern thinker, and a poet. In the chapter on Kant, Andrea Veltman sketches a 
contrast between Aristotle and Kant, based on which one might be entitled to say that 
on the one hand Aristotle has some reason, but on the other hand Kant has his reasons 
as well. According to Aristotle, I can only know who I am (from the moral point of 
view) through inspection of who are my friends as moral agents, as if I am seeing 
myself in them through a mirror, whereas, in Kant, I look forward to having a friend 
in order to be able to disclose my deepest nature without fear of being betrayed. The 
contrast, however, is too strong, for in one case introspection is barred; in the other, 
introspection is more than allowed, and the only problem is that I am not sure whether 
I can tell other people who I really am without fear of suffering later from the 
knowledge I have imparted to them, a knowledge that I previously obtained through 
introspection. 
 To sum up, this is a valuable collection, scholarly written, which is worth 
reading, and quite helpful for academic studies on friendship. It makes the reader 
ponder what friendship is through showing him or her what an impressive array of 
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